State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from August 18, 1990 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
8-18-1990 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from August 18, 1990 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from August 18, 
1990 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/317 
#2A-8/13/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of the Petition of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner CASE NO. 1-0038 
To review the implementation of local 
government provisions and procedures 
pursuant to §212 of the Civil 
Service Law and PERB Rule §203.8. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ., (JEROME LEFKOWITZ, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Petitioner 
THOMAS A. BRENNAN, JR., ESQ., for Westchester 
County Public Employment Relations Board 
LEWIS, GREENWALD, KENNEDY, LEWIS, CLIFTON & 
SCHWARTZ, ESQS. (DANIEL E. CLIFTON, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Westchester County Employees 
Union/Association of Municipal Employees 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 13, 1989, the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) filed a 
petition with this Board to review the implementation of the 
rules and procedures of the Westchester County Public 
Employment Relations Board (local board) pursuant to §203.8 
of this Board's Rules of Procedure. The petition as amended 
and clarified alleges that several of the determinations made 
by the local board in its processing of two representation 
) 
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petitions, which were then pending before it,-^/ were not 
substantially equivalent to the provisions and procedures in 
Article 14 of the Civil Service Law and PERB's Rules of 
Procedure. Specifically, CSEA's petition challenges the 
local board's following determinations or actions: 
1. Its decision that CSEA was the bargaining 
agent for a large unit of employees of 
the County of Westchester (County). CSEA 
alleges that this "essential" question 
was not investigated adequately. 
2. CSEA's appearance on the election ballot. 
CSEA alleges that it was denied its 
unconditional right to appear on the 
ballot under its name of choice. 
3. A statement made by the local board in 
one of its decisions criticizing CSEA and 
another union for their failure to inform 
the local board of an admission they made 
to this Board regarding their legal 
relationship. CSEA alleges that the 
statement was injudicious. 
-i/cSEA has since been certified by the local board following 
a December 19, 1989 election and a January 25, 1990 run-off 
election. 
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The sufficiency of a showing of interest 
supporting a petition filed by a 
competing union. CSEA alleges that the 
local board deliberately refused to 
consider CSEA•s argument that the showing 
of interest should be disregarded because 
the petitioner had misled the unit 
employees during the solicitation 
regarding its organizational structure 
and composition. 
The alleged deference paid by the local 
board to the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) regarding the release 
of voter lists. CSEA alleges that the 
local board was unduly influenced by the 
AAA's policy in denying CSEA a copy of 
the voter list after the first election 
and again after the run-off election. 
One of the representation petitions before the local 
board was filed by the Westchester County Employees 
Union/Association of Municipal Employees (WCEU/AME), which 
has intervened in this proceeding. WCEU/AME sought 
certification as the bargaining agent for the unit of County 
employees and the decertification of the "Westchester County 
Board - 1-0038 -4 
CSEA Inc.". The other petition was filed by the Westchester 
County Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. (WCCSEA). 
By decision dated October 20, 1989,-2/ the local board ordered 
an election pursuant to WCEU/AME's petition, but it dismissed 
WCCSEA*s petition on the -ground that it sought only a 
disaffiliation election which was beyond its power to direct. 
While the representation petitions were pending before 
the local board, related improper practice charges filed by 
CSEA against WCCSEA were pending before this Board. There 
was an issue in both sets of proceedings as to whether CSEA 
or WCCSEA was the bargaining agent for the unit of County 
employees. CSEA claimed that it was the recognized 
representative of the unit and that WCCSEA was merely its 
agent for the transaction of business with the County. 
WCCSEA claimed that it was the recognized bargaining agent 
and that it was only affiliated with CSEA. Affirming the 
decision of our Administrative Law Judge,-2/ we determined 
that the County recognized CSEA as the bargaining agent for 
its employees in 1977 and that CSEA had not since lost or 
2/The local board's October 20 decision is reported at 
22 PERB 58002 (1989). A second decision dated November 3, 
1989 dealing with certain election details is reported at 
22 PERB H8003 (1989). 
^/22 PERB 54593 (1989). 
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abandoned that status. The local board also found CSEA to 
be the recognized bargaining agent for the County's 
employees. It noted, however, that that entity was the same 
as the "Westchester County Unit of the Westchester County 
Local 860, Civil Service-Employees -As-soe-i-a.t-i.on> Inc.:, Local 
1000, American Federation of State, County and Municipal 
Employees Union, AFL-CI0",-§/ a notation apparently meant to 
convey the local board's lingering uncertainty as to the name 
of the recognized bargaining agent. 
CSEA and the local board have filed memoranda of law 
against the preceding background on an investigative record 
which includes the petition for review as filed, WCEU/AME's 
intervention papers, a transcript of proceedings before the 
local board on July 12, 1989, the local board's files with 
respect to the representation petitions, the local board's 
decisions, certain affidavits and correspondence filed with 
this Board. 
CSEA's petition questions the fairness and regularity of 
the local board's actions and decisions in conjunction with 
the two representation petitions. We begin our discussion by 
offering a general frame of reference for this type of review 
petition. 
4/23 PERB 53008 (1990) (appeal pending). 
5/22 PERB f8002, at 8008 (1989). 
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The conduct of the local board and the procedures it 
used in reaching each of the several cited determinations 
involved an exercise of discretion and some measure of 
judgment. Although our decisions make it clear that a local 
board can so abuse its discretion as to warrant a finding 
that it has not implemented its procedures in a manner 
substantially equivalent to our own,^/ we have not ordinarily 
interfered with a local board's decisions in recognition of 
the Act's purpose to accommodate a diversity of experience in 
local procedures. Our review is guided by consideration as 
to whether a determination or procedure is repugnant to the 
Act or its proper administration.-2/ Thus, we have said that 
we will not interfere with a local board's exercise of 
discretion unless its determination effectively deprives 
persons or organizations of their statutory rights^/ or, 
expressed alternatively, unless some "essential element 
intended by the Act" is thereby "destroyed". 
Two cases in which we set aside a local board's 
determination demonstrate the narrow scope of our review. In 
£/see, e.g., Board of Higher Education of the City of New 
York, 2 PERB ^3026 (1969). 
^/Nassau Chapter, CSEA, 6 PERB J[3057 (1973). 
£/AFSCME. Council 66. 4 PERB J[3063 (1971). 
g/Westchester CSEA, Inc. , 7 PERB ^[3067, at 3110-11 (1974). 
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Teamsters Local Union 693^/ and In re George Lesslerr 11/ we 
determined that local boards had denied the petitioners a 
fair investigation of their petitions. In each of those 
cases, the local board's conduct of the representation 
proceedingfell so far below ordinary standards of fairness 
and procedural due process that its neutrality was brought 
into question. 
Except as discussed below, the allegations CSEA raises 
are not of the type which would cause us to set aside a local 
board's determination, much less order its disestablishment 
as requested by CSEA. We see no evidence that any party was 
denied an opportunity to present any position or supporting 
arguments or to respond to any other parties' contentions 
regarding any material issue before the local board. To 
varying degrees, CSEA's allegations necessitate that we 
either substitute our judgment for that of the local board or 
that we reexamine and reevaluate the weight of the evidence 
on which the local board's determinations rest. We have held 
repeatedly, however, that our review does not encompass such 
matters. i2-/ A local board need not conduct its proceedings 
i£/l9 PERB 5[3068 (1986) 
iVl3 PERB 53023 (1980) 
^/See, e.g., In re Rita Wallace. 22 PERB 13031 (1989) ; 
Committee of Interns and Residents, 12 PERB 5[3012 (1979) . 
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in the same manner as we and unless some statutory or 
regulatory imperative has been disregarded by a local board, 
its determinations are not to be disturbed even if we might 
have proceeded differently or reached a different conclusion 
on the same-facts. 
CSEA's allegations which ascribe an improper motivation 
to two of the local board *s determinations require further 
discussion. CSEA alleges that the local board's 
determinations regarding placement on the election ballot 
were motivated by a desire to ensure WCCSEA's participation 
in an election despite the dismissal of its petition. 
Similarly, CSEA alleges that the local board deliberately 
ignored its argument that WCEU/AME had misled unit employees 
in soliciting its showing of interest to avoid having to 
dismiss WCEU/AME's petition and to ensure that there would be 
an election pursuant thereto. 
CSEA's allegations of improper motivation are supported 
by nothing more than the fact that the cited actions were 
taken, which is insufficient to establish the requisite 
scienter. Moreover, we find these allegations of impropriety 
to be drawn against a partially inaccurate or incomplete 
version of the local board's proceedings. Therefore, we find 
that CSEA has not set forth a sufficient basis for its claim 
in this respect and it is rejected. 
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Although the petition is appropriately dismissed for the 
reasons stated to this point, no different result is produced 
if we focus our discussion more specifically upon CSEA's 
enumerated allegations upon which we comment briefly in the 
order CSEA presents them to us. The local board decided the 
identity of the bargaining agent in the context of deciding 
its jurisdiction to process a disaffiliation petition. The 
identity of the bargaining agent was not "essential" to that 
jurisdictional question. The local board's directions 
regarding appearances on the ballot reflect its good faith 
balance of the rights, agreements and articulated preferences 
of the participating unions and the potential voters against 
a background of confusion, hostility and conflicting 
accusations regarding the identity and the name of the then 
recognized bargaining agent. We view as privileged the local 
board's statement in the text of its formal written decision 
which criticizes CSEA and WCCSEA for their lack of candor in 
failing to reveal to the local board admissions of fact made 
during proceedings before us on CSEA's improper practice 
charges. CSEA's arguments regarding WCEU/AME's alleged 
misrepresentations in the solicitation of its showing of 
interest were necessarily rejected when the local board 
decided that the showing of interest was sufficient and that 
WCEU/AME was an employee organization. The local board's 
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decisions to deny CSEA copies of the voter lists-^3-/ were 
solely that board's. Whether in reaching its decisions the 
local board considered AAA's previously articulated policy 
disfavoring a release of voter lists is immaterial. 
We find that the localr board has implemented its rules 
and procedures in a manner substantially equivalent to the 
provisions and procedures set forth in the Act and the Rules 
of Procedure of this Board. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
-i^/cSEA was allowed to inspect a list of persons who had 
voted in the original election before the run-off election. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RONALD GRASSEL, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10380 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS and BOARD 
OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondents. 
RONALD GRASSEL, pro se 
SHEILA GARVEY, ESQ., for Respondent Board of Education 
of the City School District of the City of New York 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Ronald Grassel excepts to the dismissal, prior to 
hearing, of his improper practice charge which alleges that 
the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) and the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
(District) violated §§209-a.2(a) and 209-a.l(c), 
respectively, of the Public Employees* Fair Employment Act 
(Act). 
UFT CHARGE 
Grassel* s charge against the UFT alleges first that it 
failed to fairly represent him by arbitrarily and without 
explanation refusing to pursue on his behalf a grievance 
which alleged a breach of the collective bargaining agreement 
between the UFT and the District in connection with the 
Board - U-10380 
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issuance by the District of a letter reprimanding him and 
denying his request for use of personal business leave credit 
for a day of absence. Grassel alleges that because the 
District partially granted his grievance, thus establishing 
its merit:,J=/ the UFT's failure to pursue his grievance 
establishes a breach of the duty of fair representation. 
Second, Grassel alleges that the UFT violated the Act when it 
failed to respond to his request for further consideration or 
appeal of its decision not to pursue his grievance. 
The assigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed 
Grassel* s charge against the UFT upon the ground that it 
failed to allege facts which, if proven, would establish a 
prima facie case of breach of the duty of fair 
representation. 
2/ 
It is unclear from the charge whether Grassel alleges 
that the UFT had a statutory duty to represent him at the 
steps of the grievance procedure which he conducted on his 
own behalf and which led to the partial granting of his 
grievance, or whether he alleges that, following the partial 
grant of his grievance, the UFT had a statutory duty to 
i/Grassel received a grievance step decision directing 
the removal of certain language from the letter issued to 
him, but affirming the denial of his request for personal 
business leave for the day in question, May 10, 1988. 
2/Grassel had been put on notice that the charge was 
deficient in this regard and given an opportunity to correct 
same. 
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further pursue it to gain additional relief. In either 
event, however, an employee organization's failure or 
refusal, without more, to pursue a grievance, even if that 
grievance has been found or is later found to have at least 
some merit, does not rise to the level ~o#~ arbitrary/ 
discriminatory, or bad faith conduct necessary to establish a 
breach of the duty of fair representation. Indeed, Grassel 
alleges no discriminatory or bad faith conduct on the part of 
UFT, but in essence alleges only that the failure to provide 
representation to him is per se capricious, because his 
grievance was determined by the District to have some 
merit. 
3/ 
If Grassel had alleged that he requested and was denied 
a reason for the refusal or that the UFT failed to even 
consider the grievance or rejected the grievance without any 
reason at all, Grassel's claim of arbitrary refusal to 
represent him might well have merit. On the other hand, if 
the UFT reviewed the grievance and made a rational 
determination concerning its merit, dismissal of the charge 
•^Grassel alleges, for the first time, in his exceptions 
before us, that some 40 other requests for personal business 
leave without advance notice were granted by the District, in 
further support of his claim that the grievance had merit and 
should accordingly have been pursued by the UFT, as well as 
his claim, discussed infra, that the District subjected him 
to disparate treatment because of his protected activities. 
Because this allegation was not presented to the ALT, and no 
explanation is offered for the failure to do so, we do not 
consider it here. 
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would be warranted. However, where no record evidence exists 
that Grassel requested and was denied any explanation or 
reason for the refusal to pursue his grievance, we may not 
assume merely from the allegation of a refusal to pursue the 
grievance that there was an arbitrary refusal to explain its 
position. Grassel's failure to allege any facts within his 
knowledge in support of the claim of arbitrary refusal, after 
being given the opportunity to do so, does not shift the 
burden to the ALT to investigate and search out a cognizable 
charge. That burden continues to rest with the charging 
party, and it has not been met here. This aspect of the 
charge is accordingly dismissed. 
A different conclusion is appropriate with respect to 
the aspect of Grassel's charge which alleges that no response 
was given to his written request for further consideration of 
his grievance or appeal of its decision within the UFT 
hierarchy. A request for information or appeal of an 
employee organization's decision, if not merely redundant 
and/or onerous, is deserving of a response, and the absence 
of one at least establishes a charge to the extent of 
requiring the presentation by the employee organization of an 
explanation for its failure to respond. We find that further 
consideration of the charge that the UFT breached its duty of 
fair representation when it failed to respond to his request 
for further consideration of the grievance is appropriate. 
Board - U-10380 
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Accordingly, this aspect of the charge is remanded for 
further proceedings, including submission of an answer by the 
UFT pursuant to the Board's Rules of Procedure. 
DISTRICT CHARGE 
As to the District, -Grassel alleges that its failure and 
refusal to grant him a personal business leave day was 
motivated by animus arising from his pursuit of another 
grievance, and that his grievance hearing scheduled for 
May 10, 1988 was adjourned in interference with his right to 
participate in employee organizational activity. As to the 
latter allegation, the ALJ dismissed the charge as untimely, 
since it was filed more than four months following the 
adjournment of the grievance hearing. We confirm that 
determination for the reasons set forth in the ALJ decision. 
With respect to the former allegations, while Grassel 
alleges animus in the denial of the personal leave day and 
the denial of his grievance seeking the personal leave day, 
he makes no allegations and was able to offer no proof in 
support of the animus claimed, except to state that the 
District/UFT collective bargaining agreement merely requires 
reasonable advance notice for utilization of personal 
business leave, rather than the 48-hour advance notice 
asserted by the District. The allegations that the personal 
business leave day should have been granted and that the 
subsequent grievance should have been granted, are 
Board - U-10380 
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insufficient to support a claim of antiunion animus. We 
therefore affirm the ALT's dismissal of the charge against 
the District, following submission of its answer, and 
following the grant of the opportunity by the ALT to Grassel 
to submit additional evidence in support of his claim. 
In his exceptions before us, Grassel makes an allegation 
that might possibly be construed to mean that there may have 
been 40 instances in which the District granted personal 
business leave without 48 hours1 advance notice.4/ However, 
he fails to present the factual source of this information or 
why, if factually supported, it was not presented to the 
assigned ALT after he was requested to provide such 
additional information. Certainly, if this additional 
his exceptions, Grassel asserts the following: 
I have asked the Board of Education for 
documentation that would show that Mr. Linder 
routinely grants absent (sic) and I did requested 
(sic) evidence that would show that Mr. Linder has 
granted up to 40? (forty?) teachers (sic) absence 
on a single day without request of any 
documentation or penalty. 
Grassel alleges in other papers presented to the ALT that he 
requested such documents under the Freedom of Information Law 
on or about August 29, 1988. However, the FOIL request 
presented by Grassel appears to make no reference to a 
request for information concerning the treatment of other 
teachers' requests for personal business leave without 
advance notice. In view of Grassel's apparent failure to 
request such information, and the lapse of time between his 
purported request and the closing of the file by the ALT 
approximately one year later, it does not appear that Grassel 
exercised due diligence in the effort to obtain information 
in support of the charge and to present it on a timely basis. 
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information had been presented to the ALJ, it would have 
constituted evidence of disparate treatment of Grassel, which 
would be supportive of his claim that he was improperly 
denied personal business leave because of his employee 
organizational activity. However, because this information 
was not presented to the ALJ in the charge or in subsequent 
submissions, the ALJ had no alternative than to make a 
determination based upon the charge•s sufficiency on its 
face. Similarly, we limit our review of the ALJ decision to 
consideration of the record as it existed before her, and, 
under the circumstances of this case (in which no showing of 
^ extraordinary circumstances warranting our consideration of 
evidence not previously presented is made), we will not 
consider Grassel's new allegation. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ's dismissal of the 
charge against the District is affirmed, and it is hereby 
dismissed.-^/ 
his exceptions, Grassel also asserts that the ALJ 
improperly accepted the answer of the District at the pre-
hearing conference, some five working days after the time for 
filing the answer expired. While Grassel*s point is 
certainly well taken that the District had a duty to properly 
request an extension of time within which to file its answer, 
§204.3(e) of PERB's Rules of Procedure affords discretion to 
the ALJ to accept a late answer, particularly if, as here, no 
prejudice is shown. In any event, dismissal of the charge 
herein is based upon the failure of the charging party to 
) allege a prima facie case, as to which the District's answer 
has no effect. This exception is accordingly denied. 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge against the 
District be, and it hereby is, dismissed, and that the charge 
against the UFT be, and it hereby is, dismissed, except 
insofar as it alleges that the UFT failed to respond to 
Grassel's request for- reeonsideration or- appeal of the 
decision not to pursue his grievance, in which regard it is 
hereby remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
herewith. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
-""-Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^» A -
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#209/18/90 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CLARKSTOWN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-11332 
- a n d - -_-..-..-•_-• -.-••.••-.. - _•__.-........— 
CLARKSTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JEFFREY R. CASSIDY, for Charging Party 
LEXOW, BERBIT & JASON (IRA M. EMANUEL, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Clarkstown Teachers Association, NYSUT (Association) 
excepts to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision to 
defer its improper practice charge against the Clarkstown 
Central School District (District) to arbitration pursuant to 
our decision in Herkimer County BOCES.-^/ The Association's 
charge alleges that the District's unilateral promulgation of 
a multi-faceted attendance policy violated §209-a.l(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The ALJ 
deferred the jurisdictional determination which would 
otherwise have been necessary as a result of the 
Association's having filed a contract grievance alleging that 
i/20 PERB 53050 (1987). 
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the District's action violated Article XXII.6 of its current 
contract-2-/ which provides as follows: 
Before the Board adopts a change in 
policy or regulations that adversely 
affects wages, hours, or conditions of 
employment, it will notify the 
Association-in-writing -that-it is 
considering such change. If it is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining, the 
Board and the Association may then 
negotiate such change, if a contract 
violation would be involved. 
The Association argues that deferral is inappropriate 
only because the arbitrator will have to make negotiability 
decisions regarding several parts of the District's 
attendance policy, some of which PERB has allegedly not 
addressed previously. According to the Association, 
negotiability determinations should be made as a matter of 
policy by PERB, at least in the first instance. In support 
of its argument, the Association relies upon our decision in 
CSD of the City of Corning, 3/ in which the AKT declined to 
defer consideration of the merits of a union's improper 
practice charge. 
The Association's reliance on Corning is misplaced for 
several reasons. First, the ALJ's determination of the 
^/Section 205.5(d) of the Act provides that PERB "shall not 
exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such an 
agreement [between an employer and a union] that would not 
otherwise constitute an improper employer or employee 
organization practice." 
- V l 6 PERB 53056, a f f ' g 16 PERB ?[4533 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . 
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deferral issue was not before us and was not decided by us 
because it was not raised on the employer's exceptions in 
that case. Moreover, Corning, even at the ALJ level, was a 
merits deferral case. At issue there was the union's claim 
to the preservation- of a noncontractual status quo regarding 
a health insurance carrier and administrator. No grievance 
was pending and no similar contract interpretation issue was 
presented in that case. 
Deferrals under Herkimer County BOCES involve not the 
merits of the dispute but the jurisdictional issue 
necessarily raised by the pendency of a grievance alleging 
that the unilateral change in issue under the improper 
practice charge violates or is otherwise covered by the 
parties' existing contract. We adopted the approach in 
Herkimer County BOCES as an alternative to the unconditional 
dismissals which previously had issued in similar factual 
circumstances. Were we to decline to defer this charge, not 
only would the Association be exposed to the consequences of 
unconditional dismissal of its charge, which we sought to 
avoid by adopting Herkimer County BOCES, but both parties 
would be denied the benefit of their mutual bargain to have 
an arbitrator make whatever negotiability determinations are 
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necessary in the grievance context.4/ The contractual issues 
which we defer both jurisdictionally and on the merits often 
parallel statutory issues or otherwise necessitate statutory 
reference or interpretation. We see no reason to exempt 
-negotiability- determinations generally from the reach of 
Herkimer County BOCES when our power to review the award as 
rendered ensures that all of the fundamental policies of the 
Act are honored. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the charge be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in accordance with the ALJ*s decision. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
larold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe r 
1/we recently have honored a contractual agreement against 
policy challenges similar to those raised by the Association. 
In Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of Buffalo. 22 PERB f3 047 (1989), we upheld a choice-of-forum 
contract provision waiving improper practice relief against 
the union's claim that its clause was void as against public 
and statutory policies. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK Case No. S-0006 
for a determination pursuant to 
Section 212 of the Civil Service 
Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Pursuant to §212 of the Civil Service Law (CSL), the County 
of Suffolk (County) has submitted an application by which it 
seeks a determination that its Local Law No. 4-1978, as amended 
on June 26, 1990 by Local Law No. 24-1990, is substantially 
equivalent to the provisions and procedures set forth in CSL 
Article 14 with respect to the State. The amendment brings the 
County's local law into conformity with Chapter 237 of the Laws 
of 1989, which extended the CSL §209.4(d) interest arbitration 
provisions to July 1, 1991. 
Having reviewed the application, and having determined that 
the subject local law, as amended, is substantially equivalent to 
the provisions and procedures set forth in CSL Article 14 with 
respect to the State, 
IT IS ORDERED that the application of the County of Suffolk 
be, and it hereby is, approved. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe] 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; NEW YORK 
FINGER LAKES REGION POLICE OFFICERS 
LOCAL 195, COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; 
and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
FIREFIGHTERS, LOCAL 1446, 
CASE NOS. U-10232. 
Charging Parties, U-10251 & U-10295 
-and-
CITY OF AUBURN, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, ESQ. (MIGUEL ORTIZ, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for the Charging Party in Case No. U-10232 
CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER, ESQ., for the Charging Party 
in Case No. U-10251 
BAKER, CLARK & SATTER, ESQS. (MIMI C. SATTER, ESQ., of 
Counsel), for the Charging Party in Case No. U-10295 
EARLE E. THURSTON, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Auburn (City) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision 
which held that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
required unit employees represented by the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA), unit employees represented by the New York Finger 
Lakes Region Police Officers Local 195, Council 82, AFSCME, 
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AFL-CIO (Local 195), and unit employees represented by the 
International Association of Firefighters, Local 1446 (IAFF) 
to file annual financial disclosure statements. 
The City's exceptions allege that Article 18 of the 
General Municipal Law (GML), as amended by Chapter 813 of the 
Laws of 1987 (and as further amended by Chapter 108 of the 
Laws of 1988) evidences a strong public policy in the State 
of New York in favor of avoiding conflicts of interest and 
favoring reasonable financial disclosure by public officers 
and employees, and that this public policy outweighs the 
public policy, set forth in the Act, favoring negotiations 
concerning terms and conditions of employment. The City thus 
argues that these competing public policies should be 
resolved in favor of financial disclosure and that its 
imposition should not be a mandatory subject of negotiations. 
In finding that financial disclosure constitutes a term 
and condition of employment, and that unilateral 
implementation of a financial disclosure requirement violated 
the City's duty to negotiate pursuant to §209-a.l(d) of the 
Act, the ALJ determined, among other things, that Article 18 
of the GML makes discretionary the implementation of finan-
cial disclosure statements, because the City has a population 
of less than fifty thousand persons-^/ and accordingly 
•3=/section 810, GML defines the term "political 
subdivision", for purposes of §§811, 812 and 813 of 
Article 18, GML as "a county, city, town or village having a 
population of fifty thousand or more and shall include a city 
with a population of one million or more." 
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concluded that, in the absence of a statutory mandate to 
require financial disclosure, a duty to negotiate exists. In 
so finding, the ALJ relied upon a decision issued by this 
Board in Board of Education of the City School District of 
the City of New York. 19 PERB 13015 (1986), which, on the 
date of issuance of the ALJ decision in the instant matter, 
had been affirmed sub nom. Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York v. PERB. 21 PERB 
57001 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1988), and as to which an appeal was 
then pending in the Appellate Division, Third Department. 
That case involved enactment of a legislative resolution 
pursuant to statutory authorization under §2590-g(14), 
Education Law which authorized financial disclosure by 
bargaining unit employees, which this Board held to 
constitute a unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Following issuance of the ALJ decision in the instant 
case, the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed the 
Supreme Court and PERB, and held the New York City Board of 
Education's enactment of financial disclosure requirements to 
be a prohibited subject of negotiations. Board of Education 
of the City School District of the City of New York v. PERB, 
147 A.D.2d 70, 3d Dept., 22 PERB H7014 (1989). Thereafter, 
pursuant to a motion granted for leave to appeal, the Court 
of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division decision and 
reversed, in a decision dated May 1, 1990, affirming PERB's 
determination (75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB f7012). During the 
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pendency of judicial review of the New York City Board of 
Education decision, we held our review of the ALJ decision in 
the instant case in abeyance, upon consent of the parties. 
Upon issuance by the Court of Appeals of a final decision in 
the New York City Board of Education case, the parties herein 
were afforded the opportunity to make supplemental 
submissions in support of their respective positions in light 
of the Court's ruling. The parties having made their 
submissions, we now review the ALJ decision. 
Our analysis of this case rests upon a determination 
whether the factual distinctions between this case and the 
New York City Board of Education case are sufficient to 
require a different outcome based upon the application of a 
balancing test to weigh the public policies of (1) the public 
employer's duty to be vigilant in avoiding corruption; 
(2) public employees' rights of privacy; and (3) principles 
of collective negotiations in public employment as embodied 
in the Act. In so doing, we note at the outset that the 
City's exceptions do not assert that the City was without 
discretion pursuant to Article 18, GML with respect to the 
enactment of financial disclosure requirements of its 
employees. Indeed, the ordinance enacted by the City Council 
includes the following language: 
Be it ordained by the City Council of the City 
of Auburn, New York: THAT pursuant to §812(2) and 
§812(3) of the General Municipal Law, the City of 
Auburn hereby opts and determines that it shall not 
be subject to the disclosure requirements under 
said sections of the General Municipal Law, in that 
the City of Auburn is a municipality with a 
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population of less than fifty thousand individuals. 
(Emphasis added. ) ^ 
It thus appears that because the City has a population 
of less than 50,000 and has in any event elected not to 
subject itself to the financial disclosure requirements 
contained- in §813, GMLy its enaGtment of financial disclosure 
requirements for its employees is purely discretionary. In 
this respect, to the extent that the holding of the Court of 
Appeals in New York City Board of Education relies upon a 
§812.2 and 812.3, GML provide as follows: 
2. The governing body of a county, city, town 
or village having a population of less than fifty 
thousand may by local law or ordinance elect to be 
subject to the provisions of this section. In such 
event, any such city, county, town or village shall 
be deemed to be a political subdivision under this 
section. 
3. Any political subdivision or other county, 
city, town or village to which all of the 
provisions of this section are made applicable, 
whether as a result of the provisions contained in 
subdivision two of section eight hundred eleven of 
this Article or as a result of an election to be 
subject to the provisions of this section as 
permitted by subdivision two of this section, may 
elect to remove itself from the ambit of all (but 
not some) provisions of this section (other than 
this subdivision) by adopting a local law, 
ordinance or resolution specifically referring to 
the authority conferred by this subdivision. . . . 
It appears that §812.3, GML applies to a governmental 
entity which has elected (if not mandated) to subject itself 
to financial disclosure requirements, and which subsequently 
determines to remove itself from the requirements. Under 
these circumstances, conditions apply to the removal, but not 
if no election to participate has already been made. 
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finding that the employer in that case was not statutorily 
mandated to adopt the financial disclosure requirement which 
it adopted, but was merely accorded the discretion to do so, 
that holding applies here. 
Indeed, the argument that the City is mandated by 
statute to enact the at-issue financial disclosure 
requirements is less persuasive here than was the case in New 
York City Board of Education. There, the employer was 
specifically authorized, although not mandated, to enact 
financial disclosure requirements, while in the instant case, 
employers like the City, having a population of less than 
50,000 persons, are not subject in any way to financial 
disclosure requirements, unless they so elect, which the City 
has declined to do. 
It cannot be said that Article 18, GML evidences a 
public policy favoring financial disclosure for employers 
like the City. Issues of public interest or public concern 
do not rise to the level of public policy for they are not, 
"based on statute, constitution or even clear common law 
principles - sources in which a public policy prohibition 
against a collective bargaining agreement might be found." 
(75 N.Y.2d 660 at 669). 
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The Court, in New York City Board of Education, went on 
to say: 
Issues of public concern, while 
unquestionably important, are not to be 
confused with the strong, unmistakable 
public policy that would - and then only 
rarely - require invalidation of a 
collective -ba-rgaining agreement-. iHere, •--
what the Board [of Education] asks is not 
even that we invalidate a collective 
bargaining agreement violative of public 
policy, but prospectively that we declare 
that the entire area of disclosure 
requirements is off-limits for 
negotiation - and on the basis of no body 
of law whatsoever. This, we decline to 
do. (75 N.Y.2d 660 at 669). 
Having concluded that the City was neither required by 
statute nor by public policy to adopt the at-issue financial 
disclosure requirements, it remains to be decided by us 
whether because the scope of financial disclosure required is 
relatively narrow, and significantly more narrow than the 
requirements at issue in the New York City Board of Education 
case, the public interest in the avoidance of public 
corruption outweighs the statutorily established public 
policy favoring collective bargaining. 
The Court of Appeals, in New York City Board of 
Education, indicated, in a footnote, the possibility that 
some limited disclosure might be within the sole 
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discretion of the employer. 3/ 
In view of this cautionary note by the Court of Appeals, 
it is appropriate that we consider the fact that the 
financial disclosure requirements adopted by the City in the 
instant case are clearly more narrow in scope than the 
financial disclosure requirements contained in §812(5), GML. 
On the other hand, the City ordinance and financial 
disclosure requirements apply to a broader class of employees 
than the class of persons to whom the financial disclosure 
^Footnote 3 of the Court's decision, at 75 N.Y.2d 660 at 
670, provides in its entirety as follows: 
Our decision in this respect is limited 
to the claims presented to us by the 
parties. As noted in the administrative 
decisions, the disclosure requirements 
imposed by the Board go well beyond the 
types of financial disclosure 
specifically enumerated in the statute. 
The unions do not argue that the Board 
exceeded its statutory authority; by the 
same token, the Board does not argue that 
disclosure requirements more closely 
tailored to those enumerated in the 
statute might in some respects be 
permissive bargaining subjects only. 
Thus, we have no occasion to consider 
whether there might be certain limited 
powers reserved to the sole discretion of 
the Board under Education Law §259 0-
g(14), as were found by the 
Administrative Law Judge to exist under 
Education Law §2590-g(13). 
Board - U-10232, U-10251, U-10295 -9 
requirements of §812, GML apply^/ or the class of covered 
employees in New York City Board of Education. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the financial disclosure 
required by the City is narrower in scope than the financial 
disclosure contemplated by §812, GML, it may nevertheless 
constitute a new term and/or condition of employment, to 
which disciplinary action applies, and to which, it appears, 
new disciplinary procedures, other than those set forth in 
the parties1 collective bargaining agreements, will apply5-/ 
as will certain compulsory acknowledgments not previously 
required. 
4/§810(3), GML defines the term "local officer or 
employee" as meaning "the heads (other than local elected 
officials) of any agency, department, division, council, 
board, commission, or bureau of a political subdivision and 
their deputies and assistants, and the officers and employees 
of such agencies, departments, divisions, boards, bureaus, 
commissions or councils who hold policy-making positions 
. . . ", while the City ordinance applies to both this class 




-/§6 of the City's ordinance provides that: 
Any person who willfully files a false 
statement of annual disclosure shall be 
subject to penalty, discipline, 
suspension or removal after a hearing 
upon fifteen days notice by the Board of 
Ethics, or pursuant to disciplinary 
proceedings as are required for those 
persons eligible under the collective 
bargaining agreement between the City of 
Auburn and its bargaining units. 
No. 7. The Board of Ethics of the City 
of Auburn is hereby empowered to 
establish rules and procedures for 
hearings in regards (to) the requirements 
of this ordinance. 
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Based upon the foregoing, it is our determination that 
the financial disclosure requirements and disciplinary 
procedures contained in the City ordinance constitute terms 
and conditions of employment as to which no prohibition 
against negotiation, statutory or otherwise, exists. We 
accordingly affirm the decision of the ALJ in its entirety, 
and find that the City violated §209-a.l(d) by its enactment 
and implementation of the financial disclosure requirement. 
6/ 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City: 
1. Immediately cease enforcement or implementation 
of the financial disclosure requirements as adopted on 
June 8, 1988 as to any City employees in the units 
represented by CSEA, Local 195 and IAFF; 
2. Immediately remove and destroy all reports or 
other documents submitted by unit employees pursuant to 
the financial disclosure requirements adopted on June 8, 
1988; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA, Local 195 
and IAFF with respect to the terms and conditions of 
employment of unit employees; 
£/The City has not excepted to the ALJ's determination 
that the City separately violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act by 
its refusal to bargain the financial disclosure requirement 
pursuant to a demand made by the IAFF. That finding is 
accordingly not before us and is deemed final. 
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4. Sign and post notices in the forms attached in all 
locations at which any affected unit employees work in 
places ordinarily used to post notices of information to 
such unit employees. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
'Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify 
all employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. (CSEA) that the City of Auburn 
will: 
1. Immediately cease enforcement or imple-
mentation of financial disclosure requirements 
as adopted on June 8, 1988 as to any City 
employees in the unit represented by CSEA; 
2. Immediately remove and destroy all 
reports or other documents submitted by unit 
employees pursuant to the financial disclosure 
requirements adopted on June 8, 1988; and 
3. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA with 
respect to the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of unit employees. 
CITY OF AUBURN 
Dated By 
(Rtpr«Mntative) (Till*) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify 
all employees in the unit represented by the New York 
Finger Lakes Region Police Officers Local 195, Council 82 (Local 
195), that the City of Auburn will: 
1. Immediately cease enforcement or imple-
mentation of financial disclosure requirements 
as adopted on June 8, 1988 as to any City 
employees in the unit represented by Local 195; 
2. Immediately remove and destroy all 
reports or other documents submitted by unit 
employees pursuant to. the financial disclosure 
requirements adopted on June 8, 1988; and 
3. Negotiate in good faith with Local 195 
with respect to the terms and conditions of 
employment of unit employees. 
CITY OF AUBURN 
D , t 0 d y
 (R.pr.Mnt.tive) (TIM.) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE 10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify 
all employees in the unit represented by the Interna-
tional Association of Firefighters, Local 1446 (IAFF), that the 
City of Auburn will: 
1. Immediately cease enforcement or imple-
mentation of financial disclosure requirements 
as adopted on June 8, 1988 as to any City 
employees in the unit represented by IAFF; 
2. Immediately remove and destroy all 
reports or other documents submitted by unit 
employees pursuant to the financial disclosure 
requirements adopted on June 8, 1988; and 
3. Negotiate in good faith with IAFF with 
respect to the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of unit employees. 
CITY OF AUBURN 
Dated »y 
W
 (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WYOMING COUNTY SHERIFF'S EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3697 
COUNTY OF WYOMING and SHERIFF OF 
OF WYOMING COUNTY, 
Joint Employer, 
-and-
WYOMING COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT., 
LOCAL 861, CSEA, LOCAL #1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wyoming County Sheriff's 
Employees Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
Certification - C-3 697 
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the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Sergeant, Tech-Sergeant, Investigator, Deputy 
Sheriff, Dispatcher, Correction Officer, and 
Sheriffs Civil Clerk, ~ •'" 
Excluded: Sheriff, Under-sheriff and Administrative 
Assistant. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Wyoming County Sheriff's 
Employees Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
'/Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 693, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3705 
TOWN OF BERKSHIRE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Teamsters Local 693, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: HEO, MEO and laborers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively'withr Teamsters Local 693, ~ ~ "~ 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen 
and Helpers of America. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memblfr 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3708 
COUNTY OF STEUBEN, 
Employer, 
-and-
STEUBEN COUNTY SHERIFFS ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Steuben County Sheriffs 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Civil Clerk Assistant, Civil Clerk, Correction 
Officer, Court Security Officer, Corrections 
Officer, Shift Supervisor, Deputy Sheriff, 
Registered Nurse, Criminal Investigator. 
Excluded: All other County employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Steuben County Sheriffs 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membefe-
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3713 
VILLAGE OF CORINTH, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full time and regular part time employees 
in the following titles: Motor Equipment 
Operator, Laborer, Foreman, Clerk. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDEREDthat theabove named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
'J?>tJ>-Md^i^_ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/ 
(y(jsfr6CL» & • &+***&**> 
] Member Walter L. Eisenberg 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3716 
VILLAGE OF MONROE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Police dispatchers, 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Offieersy Tncvv The duty to negotiate collectively includes the" 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 18, 1990 
Albany, New York 
•Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
f ' ^ V tin t II-MUTT?! I<IJ| J* 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 




TOWN OF TICONDEROGA, 
Employer, 
-and-
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200-D, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
CASE NO. C-3717 
Certification - C-3717 - 2 -
Unit: Included: Full-time and part-time Sergeants, Constables 
and Patrolmen. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: September 18, 199 0 
Albany, New York 
t&Xryw^gsH 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
JHMJGL ^ 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Membe 
